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Abstract
This study concerns one of the problems in the History of Ukrainian-Turkish relations during 
the last quarter of the 17th century. The study analyses the pre-conditions, causes and consequences of the 
Chyhyryn Military Campaign headed by the Turkish Sultan Mehmed IV. To make a scientific evaluation 
of the said problem, data obtained from Turkish Ottoman and Crimean-Tatar written sources and from His­
toriography were used. A detailed description of the circumstances of the rising conflict has been provided, 
and the attempts to settle the acute contradiction between the participants of the respective events peacefully 
has been discussed. The military actions have been highlighted that relate to the said campaign, as well as 
its consequences. The military campaign ended in the victory of the Turkish-Ukrainian-Crimean & Tatar 
Army and the signing of the Bakhchisarai Treaty. Conclusions have also been made and presented.
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Öz
TÜRK ORDUSUNUNSAGYALI UKRAYNA’YA DÜZENLEDiGi giHiRINSEFERiNiN  
NEDENLERi VE SONU^LARI
Makalede 17. yüzyilin son ?eyreginde Ukrayna-Türkiye ili§kileri tarihinin meselelerinden 
biri ara§tirilmaktadir. Türk sultani IV. Mehmed’in kendi ba§komutanliginda düzenlenen Qihirin sefe- 
rinin önko§ulu, nedenleri ve sonu?lari degerlendirilmektedir. Söz konusu meselenin bilimsel incelen- 
mesi i?in Osmanli Türk, Kirim Tatar yazili kaynaklarindan ve tarihi eserlerden alinan bilgiler kullanil- 
mi§tir. Askeri 5ati§mamn meydana gelme ko§ullari ayrintilariyla haczedilerek, ba§kaca sava§a katilan 
taraflar arasinda §iddet i?eren bu tutarsizligin bari§5il yollarla ?özme te§ebbüsünden de söz edilmek- 
tedir. Bu seferle ilgili askeri harekatlarin geli§meleri, ayrica neticeleri aydinlatilmaktadir. Adi ge?en 
sefer Türk-Ukrayna-Kirim Tatar ordusunun zaferi ve Bah?esaray Bari§ Antla§masi ile sonu5landi. Bu 
ara§tirma konusuyla ilgili kamtlandrrici sonu? elde edilmektedir.
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Introduction
According to the data available in the Turkish Ottoman and Crimean-Tatar 
written sources and, in the Historiography relating to the last quarter o f the 17th 
century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Річ and the Tsardom of Muscovy 
tried to divide Ukraine between themselves. However, the military and political 
union o f the Cossack-Hetman Ukraine with the Sublime Porte, that existed in the 
beginning o f the last quarter of the 17th century, prevented that from happening. The 
attempts to conquer Ukrainian lands by the said states were opposed at once by the 
Ottoman Empire resistance and the efficiency o f that opposition depended directly 
on the international situation o f the mentioned ally o f the Cossack-Hetman Ukraine. 
Therefore, the purpose o f our study is to interpret the information from the Turkish 
Ottoman written sources, which comment on the basic aspects, causes and histori­
cal consequences of separate events relating to the respective historical processes. 
Attainment o f this purpose is to be provided by identification o f the importance 
o f the Chyhyryn Military Campaign o f the Turkish Army in Right-Bank Ukraine, 
as well as that o f the military campaigns made at the end o f the 17th century at the 
Polish-Turkish Frontier, for the further development o f the struggle for Ukraine 
between the Ottoman Empire, the Tsardom of Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth.
Pre-conditions and causes of the Military Campaign
Within the information concerning the pre-conditions o f the Turkish Khan’s 
Military Campaign against the Tsardom of Muscovy that is available in Turkish 
Ottoman written sources, particularly in the texts of “The Chronicle” (-ui^is,) by 
Abdurrahman Abdi-Pasha1, “History o f an Armour-Bearer” (a =A yj^L.) by Fyndyk- 
lyly Mehmed-Aga2 and in works by other chronicle-writers which we have studied, 
there is data proving that during the time of the second Polish Military Campaign 
the Tsardom of Muscovy’s Army was attacking the territory of Ukraine3. Obvious­
ly, under the pressure o f the Tsardom of Muscovy, some changes in the foreign 
policy o f Hetman Petro Doroshenko, particularly concerning the Black-Sea vector 
o f the international relations o f the Ukrainian Cossack State, took place. In this re­
1 Fahri Fetin Derin, Abdurrahman Abdi Pa§a Vekayinamesi, Istanbul, 1993, S. 315-317, 338-340.
2 ^aj a^( yj(a yjla-1 a_*̂- ^Цзаа jla^i^ aî - :aap y—.J/ —Jj ^ ĵlj jla^i^ Іа-І ^Цзаа jla^i^
^  vaT ô .—o\ o . ^  1928 J d u l  y- УА.
3 The said military campaign is in details described in the monographic study (see: Туранли, 
Фергад. Козацька доба історії України в османсько-турецьких писемних джерелах 
(друга половина XVI -  перша чверть XVIII століття). К.: Вид. дім «Києво-Могилянська 
академія», 2016. С.339-340) -  Turanly Ferhad. The Cossack Period in Ukrainer’s History in 
Turkisjh Ottoman Written Sources (the second ha lf o f  the 16th -  the fisrt quarter o f  the 18th 
centuries).
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gard in the modern Ukrainian Historiography there is the following idea: “A com­
pelled transfer o f one o f the most devoted adherer o f the foreign policy o f Bohdan 
Khmelnytsky on the side o f the Moscow Tsar between October 1675 and September 
1676 meant denial o f his loyalty to his previous protectors -  the Polish King and 
Turkish Sultan, who did not want to give up Petro Doroshenko regarding providing 
him with “more rights and freedoms” 4. Regarding this point, the mentioned Turkish 
archival document -  The Royal Edict (Farman) “On granting the Hetman Authori­
ties to Petro Doroshenko” dated from approximately 28 March 1675 according to 
the Christian Calendar -  demonstrates the fact o f the recognition by the Hetman of 
the protectorate o f the Ottoman Empire.5 In “A Letter from Vizeir Coepruelue Fazil 
Ahmed-Pasha to Petro Doroshenko”, that must have been written in the Turkish 
Ottoman language and then translated later into Latin, which, according to the De­
scription o f said Fund, is dated from 2 October 1675, reads: “Hetman [Peter] Doro- 
shenko, who is proud o f his religious devoutness to the Christian leaders and busi­
ness barons, who is an alive proof o f the success, and whose virtues are his sincerity 
and justice. Concerning the affairs you [Petro Doroshenko] wrote to me, it is I, who 
is answering you at once after I received your letters.” Then the document tells us 
about the preparation o f the Governor Mehmed IV for a military campaign and the 
intention o f the Grand Vizier Ibragim-Pasha, who was the Commander-in-Chief, to 
at that point start off against the enemy of the Ukrainian Hetman. In particular, it is 
said, that some time before Petro Doroshenko had informed in one o f his letters, that 
the enemy’s army had been defeated and destroyed, while the Ukrainian lands were 
living in peace. It is also said, that “with the Supreme Lord’s help Petro Doroshen- 
ko’s enemies would be crushed, when the Happy Governor [of the ottoman Empire] 
had been passing that road” . The Vizier also wrote: “We are aware, that you [Petro 
Doroshenko] wrote to you, that, while defending his native land [Ukraine], owing to 
our [the Turkish Army’s help], the Enemy’s [Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s] 
Army was defeated, and the oppression, having taken place beforehand, was 
stopped, though now you swear, that your service would be an example o f submis­
sion and respective obedience. From our side, we shall enjoy our Sultan’s generos­
ity and affection” . A separate army was given to serve Petro Doroshenko, while for 
defending the Hetman’s country there was left a sufficient number o f warriors who 
would serve him loyally. In his letter the Vizier points out, that Petro Doroshenko’s 
own forces would not be enough for the defense o f Ukraine without the support of
4 Чухліб Тарас. Секрети українського полівасалітету. Хмельницький -  Дорошенко -  Мазепа. 
-  Київ : Вид. дім «Києво-Могилянська академія», 2011. С. 104-105. Chukhlib Taras. Secrets 
o f the Ukrainian Polivassaage. Khmelnytsky -  Doroshenko -  Mazepa. Kyiv : Publishing House 
"KyivMohylaAcademy", 2011. pp. 104-105).




the Turkish Army. The Vizier warned the Hetman, that no lack o f justice and obe­
dience should not be felt from his side, which were expected to be required from 
Petro Doroshenko. It was also underlined, that “the Commander-in-Chief Uzun 
Ibragim-Pasha o f the estimable army ordered, that all the suffered persons, all the 
population [of Ukraine] having suffered from the repressions should be returned to 
their initial situations, as it was required by the resolution (the passed and settled 
affair)” . In his message the Vizier underlined that Hetman petro Doroshenko him­
self would control governmental affairs. Moreover, to finally settle all the related 
issues the Governor o f the Ottoman Empire Mehmed IV would pass a just and re­
solving order 6.
Other sources o f the Turkish origin show that Petro Doroshenko, Hetman of 
the Zaporozhian Cossacks, having admitted the Sublime Porte’s Protectorate, be­
came Governor o f the whole o f Ukraine, and, hence, he found a way to liberate the 
country from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth шлях до звільнення країни 
від Речі. As far as the change in the course o f Petro Doroshenko’s foreign policy 
is concerned, Ismail Hakky Uzuncharshyly wrote: “Being not sure of the rightness 
o f his decision, in 1675 this Hetman broke his relations with the Sublime Porte 7 
and, under the pressure o f a threat o f being attacked by the military forces o f the 
Muscovy’s Tsar [Alexey Mikhailovich: ruling years 1645-1676]8, made with that 
a conspiracy and gave that the Fortress of Chyhyryn. The result was, that in spring 
o f 1677 9 the Ottoman Empire’s Army headed by Vizeir Ibragim-Pasha, jointly with 
the Army of the Crimean Khan Selim Giray [І], set off in the said direction, that is 
against the Tsar o f Muscovy” 10. We shall notice, that the changes in the course of 
Petro Doroshenko’s foreign policy in fact became the cause for the Ottoman Gov­
ernment to open another front - “the Muscovite” front -  in the military campaign. 
This fact is considered in the said Turkish Ottoman written sources as confirmation 
o f the stable policy o f the Sublime Porte Government in relation to Ukraine, regard­
less o f the disinclined character o f the interstate relations development.
Concerning the scenario o f the said military campaign, the decision o f the
6 Три списка съ листов Турецкаго визиря и другихъ чиновниковъ къ Гетману Петру 
Дорошенку уверительных о присылке къ нему вспомогательныхъ Крымских войскъ // 
РГАДА (Российский государственный архив древних актов). Ф. 89. Оп. 2. Л. 46. 1675. -  
Окт[ября] 2. -  (Three lists from letters from the Turkish Vizier and other officials to hetman Petro 
Doroshenko with assurances to send him additional Crimean armies. / /  The Russian State Archive 
o f Old Acts. Fund 898 /  -  Description 2. Letter 46. 1675. -  2 Oct[ober]).
7 1086 AH.
8 The Tsar’s name is given in the translitaration from the original language.
9 1088 AH.
10 Uzunçarçili, Ismail Hakki, Osmanli Tarihi. II. Selim’in Tahta Çikiçmdan 1699 Karlofça 
Andlaçmasina Kadar, Cilt Ш, 1. Kisim, 5. Baski, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1995, S. 
429.
40
THE CHYHYRYN MILITARY CAMPAIGN OF THE TURKISH ARMY
Divan’s decision to give Yuriy Khmelnytsky the authorities o f Ukraine’s Hetman 
was not accidental: that meant supporting the traditions o f the relations o f allies 
initiated by Hetman Bohdan Khmenlnytsky between the Ukrainian Cossack State 
and the Ottoman Empire, in particular between the Crimean Khanate. It should also 
be noted, that such a scenario o f the events significantly influenced the religious fac­
tor too, - namely, the support o f the Constantinople Patriarch’s decision to appoint 
Yuriy Khmelnytsky Hetman. When characterising Hetman petro Poroshenko’s ac­
tivities based on the data received from Turkish Ottoman written sources, one has 
to take into consideration the following point: “ [Hetman Petro] Doroshenko having 
begun to serve the Tsar o f Muscovy, the Ottomans discharged him from the Het­
m an’s office, while [Yuriy] Khmelnytsky was appointed hetman of the Zaporozhian 
Cossacks instead. Besides, [Yuriy] Khmelnytsky was arrested and was kept in the 
prison in the town of Yedicule n . For [Yuriy] Khmelnytsky himself was officially 
a priest, then, according a governmental order and providing a support from the 
Roman Patriarch Parteniyos IV and a Divan’s translator Mavrokordat 1 2, [Yuriy] 
Khmelnytsky got up and went. He was appointed hetman and sent to [Ukraine]. In 
1677, after the town of Chyhyryn having been freed from the Muscovites, the newly 
appointed Commander Sheitan Ibragim-Pasha was delegated to transfer that for­
tress to Hetman [Yuriy] Khmelnytsky as the new hetman” 13. Therefore, despite the 
unstable position o f the Hetman’s Government, the Sublime Porte tries to observe 
the previous terms and conditions of treaties on the open support o f the Ukrainian 
Cossack State. The said Commander-in-Chief surrounded Chyhyryn in June 1677. 
There were swamps on three sides o f this fortress erected on a high rock, so one 
could access it from one side only. Food and ammunition were supplied to the for­
tress across the River o f Tiasmyn 14, while it was guarded by 4,000 Muscovites, 
Cossacks 15 and Germans. On the 23rd day o f the siege forces o f the Muscovy were 
drawn to defend the fortress. Since 16,000 Crimean-Tatar warriors together with a 
Bosnian Army 16 could not oppose the enemy’s forces, Ibragim-Pasha had to with­
draw the siege and retreat with their cannons. Such an unsuccessful military cam­
paign resulted in the loss o f their offices by the Commander-in-Chief Ibragim-Pasha 
and the Crimean Khan (Selim Giray I). The Ottoman Ruler Mehmed IV decided
11 Yedikule (the Turkish name composed of two words: “yedi” - seven and “kule” -  a tower) -  lo­
cated in Istanbul.
12 In the Sultan’s palace.
VTf Too .̂ >̂ 1928 Jjjtjl d*La oJjd —̂*^1 LT® jJjjL  LI daJJia jj L j .
14 Tasma (Turkish Tasmin) -  the right sleeve of the River of Dnipro located to the south of the Town 
of Chyhyryn.
15 Evidently, there are meant the Cossacks that participated in the campaign supporting the Trardom 
of Muscovy.
16 Participated supporting the Turkish Army.
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to personally head a military campaign to Chyhyryn, and the following spring in 
1678 the Sultan started that campaign having appointed the Crimean Khan Murad 
Giray (ruling: 1678-1683) 17. As far as the above is concerned, it should be noted, 
that that Khan in one o f his letters, written in the Crimean-Tatar language, ( “Khan 
Murad Giray’s Yarlyk to Prince Kasbulat”) wrote being in Bakhchisarai, the cap­
ital o f the Crimean Khanate, that “ ... in case the Tsar o f Muscovy get his hands 
off the Barabashes 18 and Kyiv according to the wish o f His Highness the Sublime 
Porte’s Padeshah [Sultan Mehmed IV], and, in addition, if  there are re-estated the 
old friendly relations, then no harm will be brought to the country and native land 
o f the Tsar of Muscovy [Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich], . i f  you follow our words and 
contribute to the friendship between our two countries, but if  you fail to agree on 
the said, with the help o f our God Almighty on the “Hizir Ilyas” Day” 19, we shall 
be ready for a military campaign of the Tatar Army against M u sc o v y .”20. The data 
from this document is evidence o f an attempt at a negotiation process on behalf of 
the Sultan to peacefully settle the conflict, before settling this conflict under military 
duress.
To keep on considering the theme we shall note, that the Ukrainian Historiog­
raphy assesses the appointment of Yuriy Khmelnytsky mainly as negatively, though 
there was noted, that the Turkish party in the situation that had got then supposed 
the personality o f that Hetman to have been suitable. At the very time Ivan Samoi- 
lovych (ruling: 1672-1687), who became the single Hetman at the two banks of 
the Dnipro, was practicing a pro-Muscovite policy, for which his nomination was 
not supported 21. As for the causes o f the said military campaign, one has to note, 
that the declaration o f war by the Turkish Governor Mehmed IV against the Tsar of
17 Див.: Ismail Hakki Uzun?ar§ili, ayni eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, S. 429-430.
18 There is said about the Ukrainian Barabash Cossacks (Turkish “Baraba§ Kazaklari”). We may 
suppose, that this name originated from the family name of the Zaporozhian Cossack Yakiv 
Barabash. See about that in more detail in Turanly, Fergad. Ibidem. pp. 362, 565.
19 The name of a traditional religious Turkic holiday celebrated in spring (on 5-6 May accordi9ng to 
the Christian Calendar).
20 «... malum bolgay ki eger Al-i Osman padi§ahi Hundigar hazretlerinin muradm5a olub Baraba§- 
dan Kiyevden gol tartub mundin gayri eski adet milan yah§i bolek berur bolsa Masqva qiralinin 
ulkesine ve yurtuna hi? zarar ve ziyan bolmasdir... bu sozlerimizni moyninuzga alub iki yurtnin 
dost bolmasina sebeb bolursin eger bu i§ elinden kelur bulmagday bolsa In^a’Allahu Ta’ala Hi­
zir Ilyas kuni Tatar milan hazir-oq seferimiz Masqva yurtunadir...» ( Документы Крымского 
ханства из собрания Хусейна Фейзханова / C oct. и транслит. Р. Р. Абдужемилев; науч. ред. 
И Миргалеев. -  Симферополь: ООО «Константа». 2017. С. 299-292) -  (Documents o f  the 
Crimean Khanate from the collection o f  Hussein Feizhanov /  Compiled and transliter. By R.R. 
Abdujemilev; Academ. Editor I. Mirgaliov /  Simferopol: "Constanta ” LLC. pp. 299-292).
21 Мицик Ю. А. Чигирин -  гетьманська столиця. Київ : Вид. дім «Києво-Могилянська 
академія», 2007. С. 230-233. -  (Mytsyk Yu. Chyhyryn -  a hetman capital city. Kyiv : Publishing 
House "Kyi8vMohylaAcademy”, 2007. pp. 230-233).
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Muscovy Alexey Mikhailovich, which was named in the Ottoman Historiography 
as “the Chyhyryn Military Campaign”, was aimed most at the liberation o f the said 
Ukrainian town that had been occupied earlier by the enemy’s forces 22.
Declaration of the War
Ismail Hakky Uzuncharshyly also paid a lot o f attention in his study to con­
sidering the issues, which we have formulated on a base o f the above said sources, 
relating the political activities o f the Cossack Hetmans and the causes of the Chy- 
hyryn Military Campaign. For example, the scholar noted: ‘The Tsar o f Muscovy, 
after several unsuccessful operations o f Commander-in-Chief Ibragim-Pasha and 
the Crimean Khan [Selim Giray I] in 1678 23, sent [to Sultan Mehmed IV] his en­
voy with a letter, in which, without reminding Chyhyryn, he wrote about a possible 
prolongation o f their friendship. But the Ottoman Governor did not agree to this and 
rejected the proposal o f the Tsar o f Muscovy, while the reason for that turned out to 
become the conquer o f the above said fortress. The Sultan warned the Tsar, that his 
reply to the Tsar’s letter would be the liberation o f Chyhyryn by the Sultan. On 11 
April 1678 24 a war was declared on Muscovy 25. It should be said that, despite the 
attempts o f Ibragim-Pasha and the Crimean Khanate to liberate Chyhyryn ending 
in failure, and in the Tsar o f Muscovy’s addressing the Sultan with a proposal to 
prolong their peaceful relations between the two states, written documents prove the 
fact o f the Turkish Governor’s decisive intentions in the military campaign, so as to 
liberate Chyhyryn as the Capital Town of the Cossack-Hetman Ukraine. Develop­
ing this idea, Ismail Hakky Uzunchashyrly in his academic study said: “Therefore, 
on 30 April 1678 26 27the Padeshah personally set off for Silistre with Davus-Pasha 
27, where he appointed the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa-Pasha to be Command­
er-in-Chief, and sent that one to Chyhyryn. When the Army crossed the river of 
Buh, it was joined by the new-appointed Hetman Yuriy Khmelnytsky and expressed 
his respect to the said Vizier by kissing the Vizier’s hand 28. When Chyhyryn was 
in about a three day-and-nights’ travelling, the Crimean Khan Murad Giray (ruling: 
1678-1683) also arrived with his army. They together got to the Town o f Chyhy- 
ryn and after making the sacrificial ceremonies due to the religious dogmas, they
22 Ismail Hakki Uzun?ar§ili, ayni eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, S. 430-431. Про оборону Чи­
гирина див.: Мицик Ю. А. Назв. праця. С. 230-287. -  (About the defense o f Chyhyryn. See: 
Mytshyk Yu .A. Ibidem. pp. 230-287).
23 1089 AH.
24 On 18 Sefer, 1089 AH.
25 Ismail Hakki Uzun5ar§ili, ayni eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, S. 430.
26 In Rebiyulyevvel l089 AH.
27 Sanjak “Silistre” (Turkish), where the Chief Headquarters of the Army was located, the place for 
mobilising and training of a permanent army “Kapikulu” (Turkish) for the military campaign to 
the Balkans. Also see.: Note 483.
28 Ismail Hakki Uzun5ar§ili, ayni eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, S. 430.
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surrounded the fortress, where quite a lot o f food and military ammunition were 
available. Then it was known, that to help the fortress some other significant mili­
tary forces were to come (with 150 cannons for the ground armies) under the head 
o f Romodanovsky, so Kara Mustafa-Pasha jointly with the Crimean Khan [Murad 
Giray] crossed the River o f Tiasmyn and, while moving ahead against the above 
said military troops, they were defeating the attacks from the fortress itself” 29.
We also have learned from the written sources studied, that there was a partic­
ularly dangerous situation around Chyhyryn Fortress. As the chronicle-writer Fyn- 
dykly Mehmed Aga wrote in the 17th century 30, the Muscovite’s Army consisted 
o f about 200,000 persons. In this regard Ismail Hakky Uzunchashyrly noted, that 
“although the forces o f Kara Mustafa-Pasha and the Crimean Khan [Murad Gi­
ray], that opposed the warriors o f Romodanovsky’s Army, and they managed to 
stop the enemy attack that was approaching to help the fortress, the next attack by 
Romodanovsky’s army lasted till the time of the night prayer. The Fortress [Chyhy­
ryn] lost its strength, but the enemy 31 had not been defeated yet. This situation was 
reported to the Commander-in-Chief [Kara Mehmed-Pasha, and, since the enemy 
was planning to send new military forces to support the fortress, the Command­
er-in-Chief was asked to urgently provide an additional troop 32. The Command­
er-in-Chief indeed sent help at once to his army and owing to a strong attack the 
enemy was stopped. But another point that made the situation dangerous was that 
the enemy had managed to break the front line around the fortress o f Chyhyryn. 
Because o f that the Commander-in-Chief, jointly with his subordinated command­
ers, discussed the situation around the fortress. Ішлося про низький і недостатній 
моральний рівень воїнів. Відповідно до пропозиції головнокомандувача
29 Ismail Hakki Uzun?ar§iU, ayni eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, S. 430-431; Богданов А. П. 
Читаем политический документ: указ Феодора Алексеевича о разрушении Чигирина 
// Источниковедческая компаративистика и историческое построение: Тезисы докл. и 
сообщений XV науч. конф., Москва, 30 января -  1 февраля 2003 г. / Сост. Ю. Э. Шустова; 
редкол.: В. А. Муравьев (отв. ред.), Д. А. Добровольский, Р. Б. Казаков, М. Ф. Румянцева, 
А. Е. Чекунова, Ю. Э. Шустова (отв. секретарь); Рос. гос. гуманит. ун-т; Ист.-архив. ин-т; 
Каф. источниковедения и вспомогат. ист. дисциплин. Москва, 2003. XI. С. 61-65. -  (Bog­
danov А. P. Reading a political document: Edict o f  Feodor Alexeyevich about the ruining Chy- 
gyryn //Comparativistics o f Sdudying Sources and Historical Structuring: Digests o f  reports and 
data from the 15th Scientific Conference, Moscow, 30 January-1 February 2003 /  Compiled by 
Yu.E. Shustov; Editing Board: B. А. Muravyov (Editor-in-Cgarge), D. А. Dobrovolskiy, R.B. /  
Б.Казаков, M.F. Rumiantseva, A.Ye. Chekunova, Yu.E. Shustova (Secretary-ib-Charge); Rus­
sian State Humanitarian University; Historical-and-Archival Institute; Department fo r  Studying 
Sources and Additional Historical Disciplines. Moscow, 2003. XI. pp. 61-65).
^  V4T Too .̂ >̂ 1928 J O - J j — ̂ *^£ jj du( .
31 The Muscovite military forces are meant.
32 There is meant provision of a support to the joint Ukrainian-Turkish Army.
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облогу з фортеці було знято» 33. Hence, when analysing the circumstances related 
to the events concerning Chyhyryn, one should primarily note the low morale and 
psychological spirit o f the warriors in the Ukrainian-Turkish Army, which did not 
favor a successful continuance of military actions directed at the liberation o f the 
said town. Ismail Hakky Uzuncharshyly, while continuing to consider the raised 
problem, pointed to an improvement in the complicated situation the Cossack-Otto- 
man military forces were in, underlining that that had happened owing to the very 
thoughtful and reasonable actions o f the Vizier.
Chyhyryn Sieged
The further development o f military actions is characterised by the follow­
ing scenario: “The Muscovite troops which were moving to help the fortress [of 
Chyhyryn] were managing to advance step-by-step ahead, and when they got the 
upper swampy part o f the River o f Tiasmyn, the Muscovite’s army оhad got a re­
spective combat site. At night about 50,000 worriers were delivered to the fortress. 
Despite the complicated situation the Ottoman-Cossack Army happened to get in, 
the Commander-in-Chief o f the Turkish-Ukrainian-CrimeanTatar Army managed 
to manifest his personal reasonability and thoughtfulness, in addition he tried to 
increase the moral spirit o f the rest o f the commanders. It was then, that Barabash 
Cossacks came to help the Tsarist Army, who attacked the enemy, forming in such a 
way a separate front for military actions 34” . So, one can see from the given text, that 
a numerous army o f the Tsardom of Muscovite held a superior position, and some 
Ukrainian Cossacks were participating in the actions on its side.
After overcoming the above said difficulties, the Turkish-Ukrainian-Crimean 
Tatar Army developed military actions in different directions, which were accom­
panied with violent battles. The said actions resulted in the defeat of the Tsardom of 
Muscovite’s Army, and the fortress of Chyhyryn was liberated. And so it happened 
that the said chronicle-writers and the respective archival documents inform us o f the 
application of a new tactics of holding the battle by warriors o f the Turkish-Ukrainian 
Army, specify the chronology of the respective battling events, as well as fix the fact 
of completing the said military campaign with in the victory of the Ukrainian-Crime- 
anTatar Army. As the Ottoman Army was fighting, on one side against the army of 
the Tsardom of Muscovite, which was besieging the fortress o f Chyhyryn, and, on the 
other side -  against the armed forces o f the very enemy that was approaching the said 
fortress, and hence it found itself in a serious situation 35. However, elite forces sol­
diers, having used an underground passage, accessed the fortress and twice conducted 
devastating attacks against the enemy. This was followed by strong attacks from the
33 Ismail Hakki Uzun5ar§ili, aym eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, S.431.
34 Ismail Hakki Uzun5ar§ili, aym eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, S. 432.
35 Богданов А. П. Назв. праця. С. 61-65. -  (Bogdanov A.P. Ibidem. pp. 61-65).
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Sublime Porte’s Army. On 21 August 1678, the 33rd day o f the battle 36, the military 
forces of the enemy defending Chyhyryn were defeated, the fortress was raised to the 
ground and 30,000 o f their soldiers were taken prisoner and executed. Based on the 
written sources available to him, Ismall Hakky Uzuncharshyly wrote the following: 
“A 200,000-Army of the Tsar of Muscovite, made o f the [Barabash] Cossacks and 
Tatars 37, came onto the opposite bank of the river of Tiasmyn, so as to help the for­
tress of Chyhyryn, and witnessed the fortress having been conquered. That was the 
cause for losing all hopes for a success in the military actions, hence it was decided to 
retreat aside from the river o f Dnipro, so as to provide one selves there with conditions 
for a self-defense. By that time this army had been surrounded directly by the forces 
of the Crimean Khan [Selim Giray I] and the Commander-in Chief of the Ottoman 
Army [Kara Mehmed-Pasha]. A bloody battle occurred. The Tsarist Army defended 
very well, so the try to wipe it out happened to be a failure. The ottoman Army had 
very little of food, hence the time came to get back home” 38. It should be noted, that, 
as a result of the Muscovite-Turkish War, the Hetman Capital o f Chyhyryn, that was 
supposed to be the most important of all the Ukrainian fortresses, was liberated. The 
Turkish Ottomans felt very bad for a long time, though they did manage to stand up 
owing to the help of the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa-Pasha. In September 1678 the 
Army of the Sublime Porte returned home 39. The Crimean Khan Selim Giray I came 
home with his army too. Restoration of Chyhyryn was absolutely impossible for the 
town had been raised to the ground. The Chyhyryn Military Campaign demonstrated 
that the Tsarist Army was a dangerous enemy, which made Sultan Mehmed IV con­
sider the situation very seriously 40.
Consequences of the War
Ukrainian historians, when analysing the documents available to them, also made 
a reconstruction of the military campaign we have considered. For example, Yuriy Myt- 
syk wrote about the consequences of the war: “The War of the 70s [the 18th century] 
between Muscovy, from one side, the Ottoman Empire with its vassal -  the Crimean 
Khanate and the Nogay Hords -  from the other side, for mastering their lands of the 
Right-Hand Bank of Ukraine completed in signing in Bakhchisarai on 23 (13) January 
1681 a treaty of peace between these states. Due to Bakhchisarai Treaty of Peace the
36 3 Rejep, 1089 AH.
37 The Kazan Tatars are meant (Turkish “Kazan Tatarlari”), the so called Eshker Tatars (Turkish 
“E§ker Tatarlari”) and the Tur Tatars (Turkish “Tur Tatarlari”), as well as the Kalmuks (Turkish 
“Kalmuklar”) and others. See.: Ismail Hakki Uzun5ar§ili, ayni eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, S. 
432.
38 Gos. yer.
39 Rejep/Shaban 1089 AH.
40 Munir Mehmet Aktepe, Mustafa Pa§a, Merzifonlu Kara, Islam Ansiklopedisi, Cilt 8, Eski§e- 
hir / Turkiye, Anadolu Universitesi Guzel Sanatlar Fakultesi, 1997, S. 736-738; Ismail Hakki 
Uzun5ar§ili, ayni eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, S. 432.
46
THE CHYHYRYN MILITARY CAMPAIGN OF THE TURKISH ARMY
border line between the Ottoman Empire and Muscovite State was to be set up along 
the river of Dnipro. Turkey was to include to its territory the Northern Kyiv Region, Bra 
claw Region and Podillia Area, while Muscovy was to have the Left-Bank Ukraine and 
Kyiv. For a bout 20 years the territory behind the Southern Buh and Dnipro, including 
Chyhyryn with its outskirts, were to be not settled” 41. The Ukrainian historian thorough­
ly analysed the consequences of the Chyhyryn War and Yuriy Khmelnytsky’s activities 
in the revival of Right-Bank Ukraine, partially for Chyhyryn. This was alongside the 
Crimean military marches made with the joint efforts of the Muscovite-Ukrainian Army, 
protected by the Polish King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Jan III Sobeski of 
the magnate latifundia on the Ukrainian lands, etc. 42.
If  one should continue to consider the consequences o f the Chyhyryn Battle, 
one cannot do so without paying attention to the data obtained from the works by 
Turkish chronicle-writers and historiographers, who efficiently used the “vekayina- 
me” materials and documents from the Sultan’s administrative offices. For example, 
Ismail Hakky Uzuncharshyly stated: “Returning o f the Grand Vizier [Kara Musta- 
fa-Pasha] home did not become the end of the Muscovite military campaign” 43. The 
Vizier was appointed Commander-in-Chief o f the Ottoman Army, and he stayed in 
the town o f Babadagy. The said Turkish historiographer also underlined, that “the 
Governor of the Bosnian Area within the Ottoman Empire Defterdar Ahmed-Pasha 
received the order to construct two fortresses on the Dnipro so as to strengthen his 
positions there, provide control o f the respective border 44 and guarantee protection 
o f Ukrainian lands. In 1679 45 the construction o f the fortresses was complete and 
defenders o f the fortresses were appointed 46.
We note, that, despite the victory in the Chyhyryn War, Sultan Mehmed IV 
intended to continue the military campaign against the Muscovite Tsardom and 
declared the preparations for the next military march. Among the most important 
events in the development o f the military events o f that time we can include the 
implementation o f the above said Crimean military campaigns 47, organised by the 
Muscovite Tsar Fiodor III Alexeyevich. It is known, that when the newly appointed 
Commander-in-Chief Kara Mehmed-Pasha was staying in Babadagy, he received
41 Concerning the Treaty6 on Peace made between the Tsardom of Muscovy and the ottoman State 
in 1681, Kinross notes, that according to that treaty, the Turkish party was to cancel all its claims 
to Ukraine (Lord Kinross. The prosperity and degradation of the Ottoman Empire. / Transl. from 
English by М. Palnikova. Moscow : Kron-Press, 1999. p. 368.
42 Мицик Ю. А. Назв. праця. С. 290-301. -  (Mytshyk Yu .A. Ibidem. pp. 290-301).
43 ismail Hakki Uzun?ar§ili, ayru eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, S. 433.
44 Мицик Ю. А. Назв. праця. С. 290. -  (Mytshyk Yu .A. Ibidem. p. 290).
45 1090 AH.
46 ismail Hakki Uzun5ar§ili, ayni eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, S. 433.
47 Мицик Ю. А. Назв. праця. С. 290-301. -  (Mytshyk Yu .A. Ibidem. pp. 290-301).
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from the Crimean Khan Murad Giray a notice indicating that the Muscovite Army 
was getting ready again to begin military actions. In September 1680 48 important 
statesmen were invited to the Sultan’s Palace to discuss the possible development 
o f the events. It was decided, that the military campaign would be headed by the 
Padeshah himself, and that is why the Governor o f the Sublime Porte with its army 
went to the town of Edirne (Adrianople).
When the Muscovite Tsar discovered that Sultan Mehmed IV was going to set 
off on a military campaign against him, he addressed the governor of the Sublime Porte, 
with intermediation from the Crimean Khan Murad Giray, offering to make a treaty of 
peace. On 11 February 168149 50a peace treaty was signed. That treaty consisted of 12 ar­
ticles, and it was to be valid for 20 years. In particular, the treaty provided, that the lands 
on the Right-Bank of the Dnipro would stay under the power of the Ottoman Empire, 
while the city of Kyiv with all its fortification structures and a few palankas (small forti­
fications of a Cossack regiment) were to remain under the power of the Tsar of Muscovy 
50. Neither the Ottomans, nor Muscovites were to build any fortresses from the borders 
of the fortress of Kyiv to the borders of the Potkal Cossacks, which is on the territory 
between the rivers of Dnipro and Buh. The Potkal Cossacks were permitted to sail in 
the Black Sea for fishing. Due to the said treaty, the Crimean Khan Murad Giray had no 
right to stand on the offensive on the lands of the Muscovite Tsar, while the people hav­
ing been taken prisoners beforehand (obviously, meaning the prisoners taken during the 
Chyhyryn Battle and the Crimean military marches of the Muscovite’s Army), were to 
be given freedom. Because of the said treaty, the military campaign having been planned 
by the Turkish Sultan was cancelled, and Mehmed IV returned from the town of Edirne 
to the capital o f the Ottoman Empire -  Istanbul 51.
Conclusions
Summing up the evaluation o f the data from written sources related to one of 
the most important problems in the History o f the Ukrainian-Turkish relations during 
the respective period, we have made the following conclusions: 1) participants in the 
Chyhyryn Battle were, on one side, the Ottoman Empire, and on the other, the Tsar- 
dom of Muscovy; 2) the cause of the War was the conquering o f the fortress o f Chy- 
hyryn by the military forces o f the Tsardom of Muscovy and the change, under the 
pressure o f the Tsar o f Muscovy, by Petro Doroshenko in the course o f his foreign 
policy; 3) because of setting up a diarchy in the Ukrainian Cossack State, the latter 
behaved in its actions both on the side o f the Ottoman Army (Hetman Yuriy Khmel-
48 Shaban/Ramazam 1091 AH.
49 22 Mugarren AH. About the date of signing this Bakhchisarai Treaty see: Мицик Ю. А. Назв. 
праця. С. 290. -  (Mytshyk Yu .A. Ibidem. p. 290).
50 Ismail Hakki Uzun?ar§ili, ayni eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baskr, s. 433; Мицик Ю. А. Назв. праця. 
С. 290.
51 Ismail Hakki Uzun?ar§ili, aym eser, Cilt III, I. Kisim, 5. Baski, s. 433.
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nytsky), and on the side of the Muscovite Army (Hetman Ivan Samoilovych); 4) the 
aim of the military campaign of the Turkish Sultan Mehmed IV against the Tsardom 
of Muscovy was to liberate the town of Chyhyryn, but the audacious battles resulted 
in running that town into the ground; 5) the war between the Tsardom of Muscovy 
and the Ottoman Empire had serious economic and political consequences for all the 
states-participants; 6) the military campaign ended in the conclusion o f the Bakhchis­
arai Treaty o f Peace in January-February 1681.
Assessments of this war in the Ukrainian and Turkish national Histories differ 
from each other significantly. The arguments and facts we have presented, having re­
ceived them based on our analysis of the above said written sources, enable us to come 
to the conclusion that Turkish historiographers mainly stress the common interests of 
Turkey and Ukraine in the said war, while the academic studies of Ukrainian schol­
ars, especially the ones belonging to the Soviet period, call this historical period “the 
Ruin” . However, an analysis based on a study of sources give us grounds to think that 
nowadays there are no completely objective historical facts to suppose the Ottoman 
Empire had been the aggressor in the said war. Despite this fact, the archive docu­
ments demonstrate evidence of an attempt to negotiate a peaceful process in the hope 
of a peaceful settlement by the Sultan of the above said conflict before settling that 
conflict with a military force. The Chyhyryn Military Campaign of Sultan Mehmed 
IV himself in reply to the aggression o f Muscovy ended in the victory o f the joint 
armed forces of Ukraine and Turkey, but, certainly, all those wars came with ruinous 
consequences as their arena was the territory o f Ukraine. Therefore, when studying 
the history of the development of the relations between the said countries during the 
last quarter of the 17th century, in order to provide an objective highlight, one has to 
take into account the information available in the Turkish Ottoman and Crimean-Tatar 
written sources and in general historiographical documents.
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